By Antara Ghosal Singh

In his first public comment following the escalation of tensions in the Middle East, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that China is “deeply worried” about Israel’s military operation against Iran, and that “China stands ready to work with all parties to play a constructive role in restoring peace and stability in the Middle East.”

Meanwhile, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has already spoken to Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, and Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr bin Hamad bin Hamood Albusaidi regarding the latest hostilities.

While publicly slamming Israel for attacking Iran, China has sought to engage both countries to ensure that Chinese interests are safeguarded and that the safety of Chinese institutions and personnel is maintained. Beijing also wants to explore the possibility of mediating between Tel Aviv and Tehran as a potential peacemaker in the current crisis.

One reason behind China’s underwhelming support for Iran could be Tehran’s less-than-ideal reputationwithin China, particularly in the public opinion space. Since the beginning of the latest episode of hostilities between Israel and Iran, the dominant discourse in China is that Iran’s future appears bleak. A series of news reports, commentaries, and blogs on the Chinese internet deliberated the various perceived shortcomings faced by Tehran: it has too many traitors, serious internal contradictions, has been under sanctions for far too long—with its economy crumbling, technology outdated, and military incompetent. Criticism of Iran flooded the Chinese internet space as Iran’s senior military personnel were killed and its nuclear facilities destroyed by Israeli strikes. Overall, Chinese public opinion shows little sympathy or support for Iran—only a vague hope that Iran might sap some of Israel’s, and by extension America’s, power by dragging it into a quagmire, and thereby easing pressure on China.

Some in China argue that Iran’s refusal to allow a Chinese military base in the country, its decision to halt a railway transit, its “abandonment” of the Assad regime in Syria, and its decision to ink a strategic cooperation agreement with India amidst the latest episode of India-Pakistan hostilities highlight Iran’s unreliability. However, a common criticism of Iran remains that it has not fully embraced China.

In the Chinese assessment, unlike Russia and Pakistan, Iran refrained from “embracing China” because the regime in Tehran has a strong sense of self-esteem and autonomy, and is unwilling to rely too heavily on one country. Further, some Chinese observers believe that there has always been a strong pro-European and pro-American sentiment within Iranian society, especially after the United States, Britain, France, China, Russia, and Germany signed a nuclear agreement with Iran in 2015. Iran, they argue, has unrealistic fantasies about Europe and the United States lifting sanctions and cooperating with Tehran.

Although the Trump administration withdrew from the Iran nuclear agreement in 2017, the current Iranian regime is not seen as determined enough to develop nuclear weapons like North Korea, nor is it seen as likely to break completely with the United States and the West. In the Chinese view, given the present circumstances, it is impossible for Iran to fully “embrace China”. The Iranians’ attitude towards China is often described as high on rhetoric and low in substance (眼高手低), with a contempt for what Tehran sees as overreliance on China.

It is further argued that not only does Tehran have a complicated stance towards Beijing, but what the country can offer China is also not substantive, relative to countries such as Russia. Had Iran successfully upheld the “Shia Arc” in the past few years, it would have gained more respect in terms of Chinese public opinion and managed greater support and sympathy from the Chinese government, but not anymore. Instead, Chinese commentators have become increasingly open in expressing their distrust of and dislike towards Iran.

Explaining this phenomenon, a reader-generated article in Guancha.com observed that the era of Cold War-era generosity is over; today, great power diplomacy is driven by pragmatism. Both China and the United States face significant domestic pressures, and therefore have little room for generosity towards other nations—a trend likely to deepen as great power competition intensifies.

Discussions in the Chinese media suggest that any support for Iran will be highly conditional:

1. If Iran can adopt a guerrilla-style strategy and sustain a prolonged conflict with Israel and the United States—periodically launching ballistic missile attacks on Israel, bolstering Hezbollah and the Houthis, and encouraging its allies in the “Axis of Resistance” to blockade Israel’s Mediterranean ports—then American entanglement in both Ukraine and the Middle East may afford China a strategic breather. However, Chinese analysts remain uncertain whether Iran, given its internal fragilities, has the capacity for such sustained and full-scale confrontation.
2. In the short term, China’s priority is to ensure that any Iran-Israel or Iran-US conflict does not affect Chinese investments in Iran, particularly infrastructure and related supporting projects.
3. Over the medium to long term, Beijing would expect greater access to Iran’s military-industrial sector and broader economic opportunities as a condition for deeper strategic engagement.

Despite the adverse public opinion, China realises that Iran is not comparable to Libya or Syria. Iran is a member of both the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the BRICS. For the vast majority of Global South countries, if SCO and BRICS membership cannot shield Iran from external pressure, the credibility and appeal of these groupings—alongside China’s own reputation as a rising superpower—will be called into question.

This places Beijing in a dilemma. While it does not want to see the regime in Iran collapse under US-Israeli pressure, it also doubts whether defending Tehran is worth the cost at this juncture.

• About the author: Antara Ghosal Singh is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
• Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.